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Papers are a contribution to the debate and set out the authors’ views 
only 
 
Localism and the Big Society  
 
Overview 
 
How can communities, and in particular the more deprived communities, meet 
the emerging challenge of building the “Big Society”? This short report brings 
together a range of evidence about civic engagement and community control. 
Starting from an overview of some of the emerging Coalition policy around the 
“Big Society” and localism, it proceeds to consider these current directions in 
the light of the long history and diverse history of “Big Society” type 
approaches, then outlines some of the opportunities and challenges 
communities face in taking up these opportunities.  
 
The evidence considered is mainly drawn from a range of national and 
international studies which the primary authors have been engaged in, but 
also covers some underlying background statistics which provide a context 
within which to place the more specific studies. It takes a wide view, both 
historically and geographically. Its aim is to provide a practical overview of 
some of the key issues in achieving community control.  
 
This report comprises syntheses of the short presentations made as part of a 
cross government meeting convened by DCLG on 10 February 2011, and 
attended by DCLG, Department of Education, Cabinet Office, DEFRA,, 
DECC, and BIS. It summarises evidence presented by LSE CASE, and 
DCLG, in the context of the government‟s publicly stated position and own 
published evidence. All views expressed are the personal views of the 
participants.  
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Introduction 
 
The „Big Society‟ is supposed to help create stronger communities that can do 
more to help themselves without first turning to the state for help. In the „Big 
Society‟, communities know how to organise local events and services, are 
involved in running local schools, raising funds for local causes, providing 
local services and generating neighbourhood plans and budgets.  An 
underlying and key question for this agenda is to ask what we know about 
what mobilises communities to achieve social goals, and what drives 
volunteering, co-operation and engagement. What can we learn from past 
experience, and past studies, about drivers of community control and 
cooperation? 
 
This is not a new question, nor a question which is restricted to the UK 
context, although current UK challenges present new opportunities. These 
come from the overarching localist and decentralising government policy 
agenda covering the work of many of the key policy areas – health, education, 
local government, regeneration, crime, and others. Self-help and community 
control have become, for the Coalition, both fiscal necessities and central 
social policy objectives. 
 
This paper is therefore divided into two main sections. Following a brief 
overview of current policy objectives, the first section looks at what we have 
called “the long roots of the Big Society”. This considers examples from other 
countries of similar successful initiatives as well as evidence from the Tenant 
Management Organisation movement – probably the best UK example of 
communities taking control of their own neighbourhoods – The second part 
focuses on capacity and potential to build the Big Society. This first examines 
some of the underlying data about the current extent and nature of community 
engagement in England, then goes on to consider some research projects 
aimed at stimulating engagement through “nudges” or “tickles”. The final 
paper explores in more detail the interaction between community 
empowerment and deprivation, and what might be done to address issues 
raised.    
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Background: Current UK Government Policy Context 
1. The overarching framework of the “Big Society” is set out by the Cabinet 
Office1 as: 
 Community empowerment: giving local councils and neighbourhoods more 
power to take decisions and shape their area. Our planning reforms led 
by DCLG will replace the old top-down planning system with real power for 
neighbourhoods to decide the future of their area. 
 Opening up public services: our public service reforms will enable charities, 
social enterprises, private companies and employee-owned co-operatives to 
compete to offer people high quality services. The welfare to work programme, 
led by the Department for Work and Pensions will enable a wide range of 
organisations to help get Britain off welfare and into work. 
 Social action: encouraging and enabling people to play a more active part in 
society. National Citizen Service, Community Organisers and Community First 
will encourage people to get involved in their communities 
 
2. A more radical formulation of the overall enterprise, focusing on the 
transfer of power, is set out by DCLG,2: 
Government is overseeing a fundamental shift of power away from 
Westminster to councils, communities and homes across the nation. A radical 
localist vision is turning government on its head by giving power to the people 
rather than hoarding authority within government. 
Over time Britain has become increasingly centralised. Central Government 
has exerted a high degree of control over local action and has increasingly 
moved into the space that others should own. The time has come to disperse 
power more widely in Britain today; to recognise that we only make progress 
if we help people to come together to make life better. 
The Government is committed to a radical shift of power from Westminster to 
local people. Localised decision-making will become a normal part of 
everyday life, giving people more say, choice and ownership of their local 
facilities and services. By increasing town hall transparency, people will know 
what's going on, who's spending their money and on what. People want better 
for less in their services and we will free up councils to make that happen by 
giving them greater flexibility for local spending decisions and lifting the 
bureaucratic burden of targets and inspection. This will free councils and 
professionals to prioritise resources, redesign services and collaborate with 
others, ensuring that the vital services that their areas value can be delivered. 
People will have a greater reason to vote for councils and mayors. 
Individuals, families, local communities and particularly neighbourhoods, the 
building blocks of localism, will be re-energised and empowered, and 
innovation and ideas will flow from local people and enterprises. 
                                                 
1
 http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/content/big-society-overview 
2
 http://www.communities.gov.uk/localgovernment/decentralisation/ 
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3. This vision is further articulated in DCLG‟s “Decentralisation and the 
Localism Bill: an essential guide”3. Nick Clegg‟s introduction sets out: 
 
Radical decentralisation means stripping away much of the top-down 
bureaucracy that previous governments have put in the way of frontline public 
services and civil society. It means giving local people the powers and 
funding to deliver what they want for their communities – with a particular 
determination to help those who need it most. And it means doing what 
previous governments have not dared: reforming the excessively centralised 
tax system which stifles local autonomy and innovation.  
The power shift we want will not happen overnight. We will face opposition 
from those with a vested interest in the status quo. But we know that 
dispersing power is the way to improve our public services and get the better 
schools and safer hospitals we want. Democratic engagement, choice, 
transparency and diversity will not just make the country more liberal, fairer 
and more decentralised: they will also help develop the world-class public 
services people want 
 
4. Six key elements of action to deliver localism are then set out in the document, 
many of which are being taken forward by the provisions of the Localism Bill:  
 
Action 1: Lift the burden of bureaucracy The first thing that government should do 
is to stop stopping people from building 
the Big Society 
 
Action 2: Empower communities to do 
things their way 
Getting out of the way is not enough, 
government must get behind the right of 
every community to take action 
 
Action 3: Increase local control of public 
finance 
Government must will the means, as well 
as the ends, of community power 
 
Action 4: Diversify the supply of public 
services 
Local control over local spending 
requires a choice of public service 
providers 
 
Action 5: Open up government to public 
scrutiny 
Public service providers should be 
subject to transparency not bureaucracy 
 
Action 6: Strengthen accountability to 
local people 
Public services shouldn’t just be open to 
scrutiny, but also subject to the 
individual and collective choices of 
active citizens 
 
                                                 
3
 http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/localgovernment/pdf/1793908.pdf 
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5. It will be helpful to unpack these a bit more, drawing on this document:  
 
Lift the burden of bureaucracy: This involves stripping away the 
burdens and barriers which hold back local services and institutions, 
including removing unnecessary legislation, targets and central 
prescription.  
 
Empower communities to do things their way 
This suggests new powers and encouragement which remove 
obstacles to community action, and create rights to take action and 
unlock the potential of communities (again, some contained within the 
Localism Bill). These are intended to create the conditions where civic 
participation becomes the norm, and might include a range of local 
actions starting with the less formal activity of looking after neighbours 
or volunteering for a local service through the more formal activities of 
being a school governor, magistrate, or councillor,  through to the more 
intense activities of running a Free School or within the NHS exercising 
the Right to Request, which gives NHS staff the right to propose and 
form social enterprises to run the services they deliver. A new 
“community right to challenge” is also within the Localism Bill. 
 
Increase local control of public finances 
This is a crucial element of local control, in that it proposes financial 
devolution to local communities, rather than simply consultation around 
a budget held at local authority level. It involves action to take away 
unnecessary Whitehall controls, provide freedoms for local leaders to 
pool and align budgets e.g. through community budgets, and provide 
the opportunity for individuals to control and influence budgets through 
personalised budgeting. It also includes provisions to continue and 
expand transfers of community capital assets.  
 
Diversify the supply of public services 
A central element of the proposals is to open up opportunities for new 
suppliers to provide public services, and to introduce greater 
competition in public services to improve quality, stimulate innovation, 
widen choice and drive-up efficiency. Further details will be set out in 
the Public Services White Paper, which will provide proposed solutions 
to some of the trickier procurement and service transfer questions 
around this.  
 
Open up government to public scrutiny 
This “transparency” agenda was one of the first to be put in place, 
including the publication of greater information about local authority 
spend, and aims to ensure that local financial information is widely 
accessible and comparable, allowing communities to shape services 
and challenge service providers to do better. The aim is “to focus on 
outcome, not process, and to release such knowledge into the public 
domain as raw data – so that anyone can analyse and visualise the 
information, spot trends and make connections that would otherwise go 
unseen”. 
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Strengthen accountability to local people 
Elected mayors, elected crime commissioners and local petitions are 
elements of this approach, which is also based on people “voting with 
their feet” in terms of local choice of service providers, and 
personalised budgets. There is also an element of “direct participation” 
whereby the reforms outlined in the guide – including community 
budgets and community ownership of local assets – are designed to 
bring decision-making power to where people are already involved in 
their communities. This section concludes that “ultimately, the most 
accessible form of government is self-government” 
 
6. This paper does not attempt to provide a critique of the appropriateness of 
these policy statements as approaches to building community control and 
the Big Society, nor on their coherence or comprehensiveness. It does, 
however, seek to outline some of the evidence and history of community 
engagement in the light of the statements, and in particular uses the six 
principles of action above as key areas of focus. 
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Part One: The long roots of the Big Society 
 
PREAMBLE - Anne Power, Professor of Social Policy, LSE 
 
1. The framework of six principles to guide our assessment of progress in 
decentralisation and local initiative-taking harks back to past debates 
about community services and community involvement. The common aims 
of decentralisation have always been to create less bureaucracy, increase 
local empowerment, provide greater transparency, stimulate stronger 
accountability, and enable local dedicated budgets and more diverse 
service provision4. Current political rhetoric about the „Big Society‟ and 
community organising evokes past experiences of community-based 
action and local projects to improve conditions. 
 
2. The framework is useful for assessing community initiatives that are 
encouraged and part-funded by the public sector. Examples from the UK 
such as Tenant Management Organisations and Neighbourhood 
management and from Europe such as co-operative, social lettings 
agencies, social care-taking volunteers and tenants‟ democracy, are 
helpful to learn how best to approach the twin challenges of localism and 
resource constraints in low income communities. 
 
3. The publicly funded, community-level initiatives explored in this paper had 
a common aim to improve neighbourhood conditions for residents - they all 
rely on „community buy-in‟. This means that citizen involvement and action 
is fundamental to making neighbourhood organisations work - and the 
more disadvantaged the community or the target group, the more 
important it is that residents be involved. Otherwise damage at best or 
conflict at worst may result. Imposed solutions can provoke resident 
opposition, even where the intentions are laudable.5 This problem arises in 
many large-scale regeneration schemes which residents can obstruct. 
Gentrification and demolition decisions immediately spring to mind as 
types of intervention that can provoke negative reactions. But so do 
decisions on closing youth clubs or play facilities. 
 
What history teaches us 
 
4. For the last 200 years, England has been a strongly urban society and 
until a generation ago, a major industrial power. These realities have 
shaped the way we are governed today, under the powerful drive of 
business initiative, moral concerns, and the over-riding need for a new 
order in chaotic urban conditions. Modern urban communities emerged 
from nineteenth century squalor through the creation of over-arching 
structures of government such as law enforcement, standards of probity, 
                                                 
4
 To which we could add the eight aims of localism, which include: democratic control; formal 
volunteering; local involvement in services; community self-help; fundraising; good neighbours and 
mutual aid, and pro-social behaviour.  
5
 Power, A and Tunstall, R. (1997) Dangerous Disorder York, Joseph Rowntree Foundation 
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and local infrastructure - water, power, and sanitation access6. As we 
became wealthier, businesses responded to their labour-force problems by 
supporting core universal services - education, public health, housing, 
sanitation, a safety net for incomes, and others. In order to deliver the 
radical advances in the ordering of society that were widely supported at 
many levels of society, a complex system of governance emerged. 
Winning majority support was a necessary condition of social stability in a 
period of great social changes. Order needed to be upheld in difficult times 
and under difficult conditions. Policing, environmental controls, legal 
enforcement against public nuisance all became embedded in the new 
and complex structures of government. The long-run social problems 
thrown up by explosive urban industrial growth have broadly been 
mitigated and brokered through these channels.7 They remain central to 
our urban structures today 
 
Why government? 
 
5. It is a sign of economic and social progress that modern, democratic 
governments play an overarching role in society by providing a public 
infrastructure that citizens can rely on if they are to take positive action to 
advance community, neighbourhood and national interests. We have 
identified six conditions that are most central to local action, that are 
supported by society as a whole, in order to tackle local problems that 
have wider repercussions and costs: 
 enabling government 
 local delivery structures/organisations 
 local awareness/ know-how 
 dedicated resources 
 codes of conduct and ground rules 
 commitment to citizen involvement as part of a healthy society  
 
6. With these supports, many local but widely dispersed problems can be 
solved or at least limited in their impacts. Such problems include:  
 neighbourhood environmental damage;  
 resource wastage;  
 youth disorder;  
 elderly isolation;  
 basic area health inequalities.  
 
7. Evidence to support the argument that community based action can solve 
many local problems can be found across Europe. Research into troubled 
European estates, into neighbourhood renewal, and into community 
responses to external support shows this.8 
                                                 
6
 Briggs, A. (1965) Victorian Cities New York: Harper & Row 
7
 Hunt, T. (2004) Building Jerusalem: The rise and fall of the Victorian city, London: Weidenfield and 
Nicholson 
8
 Power, A. (1997). Estates on the Edge: the social consequences of mass housing in Northern Europe. 
New York, St. Martin's Press; Power, A. (2007). City Survivors: Bringing up Children in 
Disadvantaged Neighbourhoods, Bristol: Policy Press; Hills, J., Sefton, T. and Stewart, K. (eds) (2009). 
Towards a More Equal Society? Poverty, Inequality and Policy since 1997., Bristol: Policy Press 
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Conditions of success 9 
 
8. People in disadvantaged areas and circumstances will only want to join in 
and take action, if the immediate need is great enough and the chances of 
success high enough. This often requires the direct support of those 
advocating such involvement, whether voluntary groups or official bodies. 
Local involvement must offer more benefits to participants than costs, and 
the costs in any case must be relatively low, given the immediate 
pressures on low income areas and households. Visible success helps to 
convince a wide body of citizens that something tangible will result from 
their efforts. One of the biggest motivators is the impact of community 
action. It generates pride and confidence as well as directly solving 
problems.  
 
9. Local people need influence and access to those making higher level 
decisions, otherwise the efforts of individuals and groups will founder. For 
we live in a complex and mobile society, with an urban infrastructure that 
means that no one single group or community can prevail over their local 
conditions without wider support.10 But they need government to adopt an 
„enabling‟ approach rather than imposed solutions.  
 
10. Control over the allocation of real resources is a major motivator, as the 
spectacle of waste, of high rewards for better placed and better connected 
people, drives people to want a fairer share and more control. Riots are 
often provoked by people feeling shut out of decisions, control and the use 
of resources. In contrast, local budgets and local decision-making over 
priorities for action motivates residents to get involved, while giving people 
real responsibility.  The paper by Liz Richardson and her book „DIY 
Community Action‟ elaborate on these arguments 11 
 
World-wide phenomenon of community action 
 
11. We have argued that a government framework to support community 
action is essential in highly developed urban economies, and also that 
certain conditions are necessary for success in European societies. 
However, there are also convincing examples from around the world, in 
more rurally based, less developed, less democratic and even 
authoritarian and patriarchal societies, of community action achieving 
                                                 
9
 There is more discussion about the broader issues of community self-help in low income 
neighbourhoods, and the project, Richardson, L, 2008: DIY Community Action: neighbourhood 
problems and community self-help; Policy Press London 
10
 Power, A. and J. Houghton (2007). Jigsaw Cities: Big places, small spaces. Bristol, The Policy Press. 
11
 Richardson, L. (2008) DIY Community Action. Bristol: Policy press 
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similar levels of progress.12  Common patterns and themes emerge from 
these very diverse experiences that underline the power and 
pervasiveness of self-help, the added value of bottom-up citizen action, 
and the need for wider support, even in fragile and under-developed 
situations. Governments invariably play an important role, most often at 
the local level. 
 
12. We can adapt home grown models, based on the rich learning from 
elsewhere, and we can also apply lessons from elsewhere to some new 
problems we face such as greater inequality, youth deskilling, housing 
affordability and access, expanding care needs etc. Innovations that are 
home grown, and that are reinforced by wider lessons from abroad, will 
catch on if they show results; they expand and flourish if they bring the 
promised local and wider gains. 
 
 
                                                 
12
 Yunus, M. (1999) Banker to the Poor United States, Public Affairs; Moser, C. (2009) Ordinary 
families, extraordinary lives Washington, The Brookings Institute; Milton, D. and Satterthwaite, D. 
(2004) Empowering Squatter Citizens London Earthscan 
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INTERNATIONAL EXAMPLES OF DECENTRALISATION – Anne Power 
Professor of Social Policy, LSE 
 
13. Work over the past thirty years under various governments and in different 
countries has thrown up many fascinating illustrations of our core 
argument that localised services work if coupled with community action 
and involvement and an overarching, supportive framework. The four 
working examples illustrated here all derive from housing conditions, 
housing need and housing management13 and are:   
 
• Neighbourhood management, as piloted and then rolled out through 
the neighbourhood renewal programme (2000-2006); 
• Denmark‟s tenants‟ democracy, as practiced with legal backing through 
the Scandinavian cooperative system (in place since 1995); 
• Italy‟s social caretaking experiments, initiated in entrepreneurial cities 
to compensate for significant reductions in state support for local 
bureaucracies (in Torino and Trieste since 2008); 
• Belgium‟s social-private lettings agencies, initiated by low-income co-
operatives within the private rented sector in several Belgian cities and 
backed by the Belgian government (Agencies Immobilières Sociales, 
paper by Albert Martins, 2010). 
 
14. Each example is briefly described below under common headings to 
simplify comparisons. 
 
Box 1: Neighbourhood Management under the UK Neighbourhood 
Renewal Programme 
• The basics – a local manager is based in a local office responsible for 
the maintenance of area conditions and coordination of local services 
such as street cleaning, security, policing, schools, shops, open spaces, 
                                                 
1. 13 The examples are drawn from five main areas of research:  
• Difficult to let estates in the UK (Power, A. (1987) Property before people: the management of 
twentieth-century council housing. London, Allen & Unwin.) 
• European social housing policy (Power, A. (1993) Hovel to High Rise. New York, Routledge; 
Power, A. (1997). Estates on the Edge: the social consequences of mass housing in Northern 
Europe. New York, St. Martin's Press.) 
• Weak Market Cities (Power, A. and J. Houghton (2007). Jigsaw Cities: Big places, small spaces. 
Bristol, The Policy Press; Power, A. et al. (2010). Phoenix Cities: the fall and rise of great 
industrial cities. Bristol, Policy Press; Power, A Et al. (2008) Tale of 7 Cities York, Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation) 
• Community- level research into families in difficult areas (Power, A. (2007). City Survivors: 
Bringing up Children in Disadvantaged Neighbourhoods, Bristol: Policy Press; Power, A. and K. 
Mumford (2003). East Enders : family and community in east London. Bristol, The Policy Press; 
Power, A (2011) Family Futures Bristol, policy Press) 
• Tenant co-operatives, tenant management, and community-based housing organisations (Power, A. 
and J. Houghton (2007). Jigsaw Cities: Big places, small spaces. Bristol, The Policy Pressl; Power, 
A. (2004) Neighbourhood management and the future of urban areas, CASEPaper 77, London, 
LSE) 
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covering around 2000-5000 homes and spaces. The neighbourhood 
manager is also responsible for consultation and collaboration with 
residents including young people. Local budgetary control is essential for 
local problem solving to work; and a dedicated funding stream from public 
and private sources is essential for local decision-making, a sense of 
control, community buy-in and ground-level progress. 
• Examples: 
– Broadwater Farm – began in 1983 and continued to date; 
– Town Centre Management companies; 
– Tenant Management Organisations.  
• Origins  
–  Poor estate and area conditions; 
– Need for hands-on local coordination of locally delivered services; 
– Urgency of better community relations 
• Community Impacts 
– Reduced crime / increased security 
– More confidence in the area  
– More representation and involvement 
– More activities for youth and children 
– More community-based activity 
• Proven Value – costs and benefits 
– Repair and cleaning performance improves; 
– Street supervision and security become higher priorities; 
– Local office provides accessible conduit for local problem-
solving and local priorities; 
– Resident satisfaction rises; 
– Relatively low cost - £50 per household per annum; 
– Lower insurance costs for households shops and other 
activities; 
– Lower vandalism and youth behaviour costs 
– Lower maintenance and repair costs 
• Government underpinning 
– Core funding for core environmental maintenance; safety and 
community well-being, now incorporated into a single pot for all local 
government spending.14 
 
 
 
Box 2: Tenants’ democracy, Denmark 
• The basics:  
– Elected tenant board on every estate of 50+ homes 
– Elected tenant majority representing each estate on all Danish 
housing company boards  
– Tenant training in essential housing, community, financial and legal 
obligations 
– Requirement to place estate staff on all social housing estates of 50 
                                                 
14
 Power, A. (2004) Neighbourhood management and the future of urban areas, CASEPaper 77, 
London, LSE; Urban Task Force (1999) Towards an urban renaissance; final report of the Urban Task 
Force, London, Stationery Office. 
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or more units 
– Legally underpinned and funded through social housing framework 
• Examples: 
– All social housing companies in Denmark with variants in all 
Scandinavian countries  
• Origins: 
–  Viking co-operative traditions 
– Dislike of over-powerful state 
– Practice of delivering public services through co-operatives  
– Long tradition of voluntary action and citizen engagement 
• Proven Value – costs and benefits 
– Lasting model, citizen-based housing organisations evolved in late 
nineteenth century; 
– Almost universally popular with tenants and landlords; 
– Shared responsibility between tenants, landlords and social 
agencies; 
– Sustained high standards of housing management; 
– Viability of large estates underpinned; 
– Active community organisations stimulated and encouraged; 
– Pro-social attitudes fostered and rewarded; 
– Resulting in relatively low crime and anti-social behaviour; 
– Many locally supported and organised activities for children and 
young people; 
– Relatively low cost 
• 2% rent budget is dedicated to tenant initiated activities on 
each estate 
• 12% of rent budget is reserved for caretaking and cleaning 
on each estate 
• Other dedicated local budget items include repairs and 
planned maintenance, open space maintenance and local 
management, which underpin delivery of tenant democracy 
linked to high quality estate management 
• All activities funded from ring fenced rent account 
• Community Impacts 
– Frequent, easy communication between local staff and tenants; 
– Constant skill development and enhanced sense of responsibility 
among tenants; 
– Lots of social activity, social capital, community spaces 
– High standards of management 
– Attractive, well maintained estate environments 
• Government underpinning 
– Regulated social housing rents 
– Defined role for tenants 
– Subsidies for social activities15 
 
                                                 
15
 Power, A. (1993) Hovel to High Rise. New York: Routledge; Power, A. (1997). Estates on the Edge: 
the social consequences of mass housing in Northern Europe. New York, St. Martin's Press; Wilkinson, 
R. and Pickett, K. (2009) The Spirit Level: Why more equal societies almost always do better London: 
Allen Lane; Power, A. (1999) High-rise Estates in Europe: Is rescue possible? Journal of European 
Social Policy Vol. 9 (2) p. 139-163;  
 15 
Note: the first principle, lifting the burden of bureaucracy, does not strictly 
apply as Denmark and other Scandinavian countries strongly endorse 
government regulation of almost all forms of collective activity. Many 
outsiders/ critics argue that the costs of this are high and the tax rate is high. 
However, the benefits are also high and the competitiveness of Scandinavian 
countries in exports, high tech design, environmental technologies, economic 
and social innovation is not in question. On the other hand, Danish and 
Swedish governments encourage and support independent and arm‟s length 
structures for housing, schools and many other social enterprises, often in the 
form of co-operatives. 
 
 
Box 3: Social Caretaking in Italy 
• The Basics 
– Young people, usually students are recruited as volunteers to help 
provide support to vulnerable tenants, giving 10hrs a week to help 
elderly or fragile residents living in blocks of old, run down „IACP‟ 
flats in exchange for cheap rent 
– They visit and shop for the elderly 
– They check vulnerable tenants are ok, help people to the doctor‟s 
etc 
– They organise social activity in the block 
– They report problems to social services and to the housing 
companies 
• Examples 
- Torino, San Salvario, Trieste 
• Origins 
– Strong tradition of regional, and city-based initiatives 
– Civic and co-operative traditions 
– Strong value placed on social capital 
– Very limited social housing (maybe 5% in Torino, much less in 
most places) 
– Fear of marginalisation of vulnerable groups 
– Weak state provision 
– Role of Bank Foundations as funders of charitable activity 
• Proven value – costs and benefits 
– Big cost reductions in health and social care 
– Increase in social activity and satisfaction with accommodation 
– Minimal organisation required 
– Much better supervision of conditions and quick reporting 
– Many willing volunteers, but careful selection is essential 
– Very useful to students to get cheap rent 
– Helps social landlord maintain conditions and meet social 
obligations 
– Costs around £180 per month per block of flats 
• Community impacts 
– Gives students greater sense of responsibility 
– Elderly feel more secure 
– More social contact between young and old and between 
neighbours 
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– Develops creative instincts in young people 
– Solves a big social problem cheaply 
• Government underpinning 
– Housing subsidies to IACP 
– Legal requirement on banks to dedicate some profits to a 
Foundation to support community benefits 
Note: Italy has high levels of owner occupation including co-operatives, 
private renting, and tied accommodation. Only 25% of housing is provided 
through social landlords which are independent housing companies 
subsidised by the State called IACP 
 
This project fulfils all six principles and all eight goals, although it operates on 
a very small scale and would be hard to spread more widely without more 
widespread public endorsement 
 
Box 4: Co-operative Social Lettings Agencies, Belgium 
• The basics 
– Low income private tenants desperate for better conditions, 
including many recent immigrants, organise lettings co-operatives 
to secure reasonable rents and repairs from private landlords, who 
let to members under these conditions in exchange for negotiated 
agreements through the co-operative over tenancy conditions 
– Intermediary co-operative organisations make agreements with 
owners of empty property to let the property to members at an 
affordable rent on a 10-year lease in exchange for carrying out 
basic repairs, offering a low but secure return on the asset in the 
form of regular rent income, with a guarantee of careful 
management of property  
• Examples 
– Bruxelles, Ghent, Antwerp Agences Sociales Immobilières 
• Origins 
– Market pressures on housing, caused by arrival of the European 
Commission, the World Trade Centre etc. in Bruxelles 
– High immigration from North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa 
– Very little social housing (less than 1%) 
– Co-operative tenant management organisations based on Islington 
TMOs but in the private sector 
– Lots of unused and under-used property in inner Bruxelles 
– Recognised role of intermediary bodies in organising private 
tenants and brokering agreements with landlords 
• Proven Value – costs and benefits 
– Low cost, affordable rents for low income tenants, subsidised by 
government 
– The asset remains with the owner without maintenance costs as 
the co-operative carries these 
– Owners secure a regular return on their previously unused asset 
– Tenants secure affordable rents, better conditions, and security for 
up to 10 years 
– Properties are restored to use from a dilapidated condition (owners 
pay for basic initial repairs) 
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– Co-operative lettings help meet a big demand for affordable rents 
particularly from immigrant groups 
– Costs are the government rent subsidy, but no capital cost; the 
organisational costs of the co-operative are met from rents 
– The management and repairs are deducted from the rent before 
the balance is paid to owner 
• Community impacts 
– 500 co-operative social lettings agency lets in Bruxelles 
– Tenants and owners report high levels of satisfaction with this 
mutually beneficial model 
– New bridges are built between the relatively rich and poor, with 
more positive tenant-landlord relations 
– Rescue of otherwise empty property and its restoration to 
beneficial use creates an affordable supply of rented housing 
• Government underpinning 
– Official recognition of Agences Immobilières Sociales 
– Rent subsidy for low income households through the Agencies 
 
Common characteristics of community-based services 
 
15. These four types of decentralised and locally based initiatives share some 
common features that bring tangible benefits to residents and providers 
and government while reducing costs: 
 
• They target disadvantaged communities where need is greatest and 
therefore the motivation to do things differently is high; 
• They work well because of their local scale but can be applied much 
more widely while continuing to operate at a local scale in many 
different areas; 
• They are all relatively low cost, offering a high return as well as many 
social benefits; 
• They all require a wider supporting framework - even in the Italian 
and Belgian cases where governments are weak and independent 
organisations more crucial; 
• They require steady, low-level resources over time, rather than short 
bursts of special programme funding; 
• They reward active residents and volunteers, mainly through non-
monetary social recognition and satisfaction 
• They offer high value to public, private and community interests, 
and they generate no known disbenefits, since the resources they use 
would need to be used for those purposes anyway, but to much lower 
effect16 
                                                 
16
 Hills, J., Sefton, T. and Stewart, K. (eds) (2009). Towards a More Equal Society? Poverty, Inequality 
and Policy since 1997., Bristol: Policy Press; 
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Evidence of success? 
 
16. Areas with localised, direct services, in variable forms, show many 
different measurable signs of progress in basic indicators, such as better 
staff performance, lower direct and indirect costs, higher satisfaction 
among residents and staff, lower turnover of residents, less trouble and 
damage. The models described above are proving durable and popular, 
not only with needy residents in needy areas but also with politicians and 
public administrators. Many of them are adopted in less distressed, more 
average areas, particularly where there is clear government backing, as in 
tenant democracy in Denmark. There is rapid take-up of these ideas 
whenever the government is willing to provide essential backing in an 
enabling way.  
 
17. Strong social arguments exist in favour of local management of parks and 
street maintenance, since a short chain of command is essential for 
effective action and problem solving. This simpler process leads to a 
measurable reduction in social and management costs which reinforces 
the value of such initiatives. 
 
18. The targeted community based organisations and approaches we 
examined were able to identify visible results on ground. This evidence 
supports a local approach, even though monitoring information is often not 
collated systematically. The research which this paper draws on can be 
checked for more detailed documentation of the way the initiatives work 
and how they impact. 
 
Conclusions 
 
19. The lessons we draw about community-based services from international 
experience and from long-run experiments in this country can be 
summarised as follows: 
 
• Community based approaches to social problems have a strong and 
lasting track record; 
• Cooperative forms of action are deeply embedded in human society, 
and draw on long-run traditions, and inherent human characteristics; 
• People instinctively want to problem-solve; 
• Social control and innovation carry high social rewards and people are 
altruistic enough to work for this within their own communities;17 
• Core ideas about the organisation and delivery of local services are 
transferable, while the detail must evolve locally to fit local cultural and 
political patterns; 
                                                 
17
Riddley, M. (1997) The Origins of Virtue London, Penguin Books.  
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• „Outside‟ solutions need to be adapted and to match local needs, as 
the Belgian „Agences Immobilières‟ drawing on Islington tenant co-
operatives demonstrate.18 
20. In relation to the „Big Society‟ agenda, this evidence suggests it needs a 
different kind of enabling government, widespread public support and 
significant community learning, since: 
 In the cases we have explored, a public framework, oversight, 
regulation, and resources have proved central to community 
confidence and community buy-in. Local involvement relies on a basic 
level of publicly funded services in highly developed and complex cities 
in order to ensure adequate support and enforcement for basic 
conditions.  
 Without a locally based and active presence it is impossible to „tune in‟ 
to local priorities, giving „voice‟ to less skilled, less articulate, less 
organised communities.  
 Above all, young people need to have a voice in order to integrate 
them into secure and stable community.  
 The same applies to ethnic minority communities, a most urgent 
priority. This is hard to achieve in low income communities without a 
direct local structure to open doors and organise action to address 
problems. The same experience applies across the UK and Europe.19 
 
21. Without government support, either direct or indirect, none of the 
examples we have discussed would work. Even the Italian example works 
because of legal enforcement on Bank Foundations and only operates in 
publicly sponsored social housing organisations, while in Belgium, 
government rent supplements guarantee a modest return to private 
landlords, and an affordable rent for low income tenants. More expensive 
government programmes cannot be widely replicated, whereas the low-
level, mainstream support needed for these programmes is more 
affordable, partly because it saves on other costs. 
 
22. Finally, localised approaches to community problems have universal 
relevance, even though they will take different forms in different areas and 
countries. They are inspiring because they offer win/win solutions; better 
services at lower costs; savings and benefits; community gains; and some 
equalisation of conditions.20 Our study of neighbourhood initiatives and 
evaluations of government-backed local programmes such as these shows 
that local initiatives along the lines of neighbourhood management, 
tenants‟ democracy and social care-taking help to resolve local problems 
and positively close the gap in conditions.  
 
                                                 
18
 Axelrod, R. (1984) The Evolution of Cooperation, USA, Robert Axelrod; Birchall, J. (1994) Coop: 
The people’s business, Manchester, Manchester University Press. 
19
 Power, A et al. (2008) Tale of 7 Cities York, Joseph Rowntree Foundation;  
20
 (Hills, J., Sefton, T. and Stewart, K. (eds) (2009). Towards a More Equal Society? Poverty, 
Inequality and Policy since 1997., Bristol: Policy Press; Power, A. (2001) Family Futures. Bristol, 
Policy press. 
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LEARNING FROM TENANT MANAGEMENT ORGANISATIONS21   
Rebecca Tunstall, LSE 
 
Introduction 
 
1. Tenant Management Organisations (TMOs) build on a long history of 
cooperative housing development and management in the UK and 
elsewhere. They involve a group of social housing residents from a 
particular neighbourhood, estate or block taking on responsibilities and 
budgets for managing social housing from their landlords, under a 
management agreement. 22 Typical TMO powers and responsibilities 
include repairs reporting, monitoring; arrears recovery; allocations admin; 
some allocations policy; staff employment; budget management; and 
contract negotiation23.  
 
2. In 2002, there were 201 TMOs in England24 not much changed from the 
201 recorded eight years previously25 suggesting little recent growth in the 
sector. They operate in over 60 local authority areas in England, 
concentrated in London and the North West; manage on average under 
400 homes; and have about 80,000 homes in management across 
England - 3% of the total local authority stock, about 2% of all social 
housing stock and about 1% of all homes in England. 
  
3. Depending on size, responsibilities and volunteer capacity, TMOs may 
have staff, may employ businesses or staff under contract to provide 
certain services, or work entirely via volunteer residents. In most cases the 
handful of most active board members worked 1-2 days/week fte (unpaid). 
This was a substantial commitment and made it hard to combine 
involvement with paid work.  
 
4. Depending on the size of the TMO board and the number of homes 
managed by the TMO, the number of board members totalled 1%-18% of 
all residents26. Thus the great majority of residents have less direct 
involvement in the TMO, and one of the tasks of TMO resident board 
members is to stay in touch with other residents. 
 
 
                                                 
21
 This section draws on three major studies of TMOs and recent consultation with the National 
Federation of TMOs, cited in the footnotes and at the end of this section. 
22
 Legislation, first in 1975, and later in 1986 and 1993, required local authorities in England to enable 
their tenants to set up TMOs, and set out the processes though which this should occur. There has been 
further guidance to adapt procedures, most recently following the creation of the Tenant Services 
Authority in 2008. 
23
 Further background details on TMOs can be found at Tunstall, R (2000) The potential of 
participation in social policy and administration: The case of Tenant Management Organisations in 
English council housing. PhD thesis. Department of Social Policy, LSE. (Available in full from 
http://lse.academia.edu/RebeccaTunstall/Papers) 
24
 Cairncross et al. (2002) Tenants managing: an evaluation of tenant management organisations in 
England, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister: London. 
25
 An estimated 210 according to the National federation of TMOs (NFTMOs data 2010). 
26
 Tunstall (2000) 
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TMOs and Big Society principles 
 
5. TMOs provide real examples of the following principles in action: 
• Empower people to take action: TMO legislation empowers council 
tenants and leaseholders to set up TMOs; funding is available to 
empower them to do this27; TMOs take action by planning and 
monitoring housing management services, and in some cases 
literally providing services themselves. 
• Let local people control public spending The TMO board controls 
the budget it has negotiated to provide services under the 
management agreement. Most TMOs make some changes to how 
budgets are used. However, the landlord retains control over 
substantial capital and other spending for management 
responsibilities it retains, and retains ownership of homes. 
• Diversify the supply of services The TMO board itself represents a 
diversification of provision. If this is permitted under the 
management agreement, residents may replace staff, renegotiate 
contracts for service provision by others, or provide services 
themselves. Many have made small changes, for example in 
renegotiating contracts.  
• Strengthen democratic accountability The TMO board becomes 
accountable at very local level for planning and delivering the 
services it provides under the management agreement, and is 
subject to scrutiny through informal contact, AGMs, local authority 
monitoring and elections. The landlord retains responsibility for 
some policies and services and the local authority councillors 
remain in place. The TMO board must manage relations with both 
the local authority and TMO residents. 
 
The impact of TMOs 
 
6. Evidence28  suggests TMOs were not expensive to set up, offered a 
generally good quality service, and in some cases a much improved or 
innovative service, usually in more deprived areas and often in 
circumstances where local authorities had found housing „difficult to 
manage‟. For example, the most recent study (Cairncross) concluded:  
TMOs are providing an effective service… In most cases, they are 
doing better than their host local authorities and compare favorably 
with the top 25% of local authorities”  
 
7. Many have had an impact beyond housing management, for example 
taking over responsibility for community development, and development of 
individuals, as well as influencing wider local authority attitudes to tenant 
participation or by developing ideas for new services. They can have the 
potential to act as potential supporters of other community groups and 
                                                 
27
 http://www.communities.gov.uk/news/newsroom/1840494 
28
In the 1990s and 2000s, there have been three major pieces of research on TMOs –referenced at the 
end of this section or in footnotes -  which have assessed their growth and evaluated their impact up to 
2002: Price Waterhouse 1995; Tunstall 2000; Cairncross et al. 2002;  since 2002 the main 
complementary studies are Millward 2005 and McCabe et al. 2007 
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form part of mature local „ecosystems‟ of community groups. However it is 
possible that the relative advantage TMOs can offer became less marked 
as housing management performance improved more generally over the 
past ten years. 
 
8. TMOs which had the most impact were those developed from pre-existing 
residents groups, where residents took the initiative, and where residents 
were strongly motivated, for example by conflict with the local authority or 
a plan to transform the area. TMOs which reported a good experience with 
their TMO development agents; and support from the local authority also 
had more impact, as did those who had taken on more responsibilities 
under the management agreement, were older, managed fewer homes, or 
were in a region or local authority with lots of TMOs. 
 
9. Interestingly, and unlike some other past and possible future examples of 
third sector and „Big Society‟ activities, TMOs are concentrated in deprived 
areas, and they are run by and for residents of these areas. There is also 
no evidence that they have taken resources from other local areas.  
 
10. Not all TMOs have survived. Although there is no national survival data, of 
16 case study TMOs researched in 1998, five or nearly a third had closed 
by 2011, thirteen years later. All five were in areas affected by stock 
transfer, and either closed during transfer plans or after transfer took 
place. The remaining eleven of the sixteen were still going in 2011; and 
their average age now 20 years.  
 
Conclusion: what helps and hinders TMO development and 
sustainability? 
 
11. The evidence suggests that amongst the key features involved are: 
  
• A statutory framework: including legislation giving a Right to Manage 
(as provided in 1975) or substantial incentive to landlords/current 
power holders 
• Formal powers and a related local board structure for local  
democratic control 
• Local authority support, and a history of tenant participation  
• Funding and training to support residents to develop management 
agreements and carry out their tasks, and the development of a group 
of independent training organisations to provide this support 
• Continued central government interest and priority over other 
service providers, and active management of any tensions between 
encouraging TMOs and other aims of housing policy. 
 
12. The model could be applied outside housing, for example in other local 
government neighbourhood services, schools, health, but it will work best 
where users‟ knowledge of needs gives comparative advantage and where 
necessary technical skills could be acquired fairly quickly. It could be 
applied on slightly larger scale, perhaps the low thousands of households. 
It could be applied in a weakened form where service users take on less 
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direct responsibility and concentrated on monitoring or a limited range of 
services.  
 
13. Finally, the long and relatively well-documented experience of TMOs 
demonstrates that it is possible to create 100s of new co-producing orgs 
providing a small minority of the total service for low millions of pounds – 
although this has been over a period of ten to twenty years. TMOs seem to 
suggest that less advantaged members of the public can become involved 
in the co-production of services when these opportunities for involvement 
are targeted on the key services they use. However TMOs did not form in 
most places, and where concentrated in particular places: where local 
authorities and residents both had the motivation and ability to take up the 
opportunities created by legalisation and funding. It is also important to 
note that in addition to creating an ongoing burden on service users and 
activists, TMOs also create an ongoing support and regulatory burden on 
government and local authorities. 
 
 
Additional References: 
Further details of the material in this section can be found at:  
 
McCabe, Al Chilton, L; Purdue, D; Wilson, M; Evans, L; Ardon, R (2007) 
Learning to change neighbourhoods: Lessons from the Guide Neighbourhood 
programme: Evaluation report London: CLG 
 
Millward, L (2005) „Benefits not barriers: a different way of attracting people to 
tenant participation?‟ Paper to Housing Studies Association Conference, York, 
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Part Two: Capacity and potential to build the Big 
Society 
 
WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT THE EXTENT OF COMMUNITY 
ENGAGEMENT IN DIFFERENT COMMUNITIES? – Baljit Gill and Karen 
Cave, DCLG 
 
1. This section sets out some of the underlying evidence around the current 
extent of volunteering, community engagement, and trust in England29 
based largely on evidence from the DCLG Citizenship Survey, and the 
Hansard Society Audit of Political Engagement.30  
 
2. The question at issue is whether the patterns of participation set out below 
will have a material effect on the way in which the Big Society might 
operate in different places, which will be explored in more detail in Ruth 
Lupton‟s paper which follows. In this section we simply point to some of 
the evidence around capacity and to some differences between groups, 
focusing on:  
 
 empowering people so they can make decisions affecting their local 
area;  
 
 the importance of community networks and spaces; and 
 
 encouraging people to volunteer in improving their areas. 
 
3. In approaching the question of whether the Big Society will look different in 
different places, we note that neighbourhoods have different mixes of 
capacities and problems; each one works in its own way. We therefore 
need to be alert to the different opportunities which exist in the more 
deprived neighbourhoods. This is an issue which has been explored by the 
recent RSA Social Networks study which suggests we should look more 
positively at the existing resources and networks in these areas,31 and that 
there are considerable opportunities, in the context of the emerging Big 
Society agenda, to develop a more detailed understanding of the capacity 
of these networks to support local empowerment and engagement.  
 
Empowering people so they can make decisions affecting their local 
area 
                                                 
29
 Please note the exception that any figures quoted from the Audit of Political Engagement relates to 
Great Britain 
30
 The sources of the main figures in this section are referenced out at the end. The Citizenship Survey, 
the main resource used, is updated each quarter and so for the most up to date figures see the website 
www.communities.gov.uk/communities/research/citizenshipsurvey   
31
Jonathan Rowson, Steve Broome and Alasdair Jones  2010: Connected Communities:  How social 
networks power and sustain the Big Society. RSA, London 
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4. Currently, few people feel empowered: only around 1 in 3 adults (38%) 
think they can influence local decisions. The level of influence that people 
feel they have over local decisions is unchanged since 2003, when 38% 
felt they could influence decisions locally.  There is evidence that White 
people feel less able to influence decisions than other ethnic groups (38% 
compared with between 47% and 58% of the other ethnic groups).  
 
5. The proportion of adults who feel they can influence local decisions does 
not differ between those who live in the most deprived areas and those in 
the least, but there are differences in whether people feel it is important to 
be able to influence decisions: 80% of adults in the least deprived lower 
super output areas (LSOAs) feel it was important to be able to influence 
local decisions compared with 72 - 73 % of people in the 30 per cent most 
deprived LSOAs.32 
 
6. In 2008, there was a noticeable difference between members of different 
social classes in their desire to get involved in decision-making.  ABs 
(59%) and C1s (53%) are far more likely to want to get involved in 
decision-making in their local area compared to 39% of C2s and 38% of 
DEs that say the same33.  
 
7. The chief reasons given by respondents to The Audit of Political 
Engagement34 who felt they had no influence decision making related to 
feeling that institutions do not listen to them or do not treat their opinion 
with importance35:  
o „Nobody listens to what I have to say‟ :  29% of people who do 
not feel able to influence decisions gave this reason  
o „Decisions are made without talking to the people‟ – 20% 
o „The system doesn‟t allow for me to have an influence‟ – 19% ; 
o „My opinion isn‟t important‟ – 14%; and  
o „I‟m not given the opportunity to have an influence‟ 14% 
 
8. A further reason given by 17% of these respondents who felt unable to 
influence local decisions was that „politicians are just out for themselves‟. 
Lack of trust in institutions has been found to undermine empowerment. A 
study found that the point of involvement in decision making processes 
proved crucial to demonstrating trustworthiness with the public. In general, 
involvement of the public occurred too late in community level decisions. 
Where the public did not feel able to influence the decisions, the view of 
the council became overwhelmingly negative. Consultations proved to 
worsen frustration, as it appeared the council was not listening to citizens 
                                                 
32
 Unless otherwise stated, the most deprived areas are defined as the 10% of Lower Super Output 
Areas in England ranked the highest according to the English Index of Multiple Deprivation 2010 (i.e. 
a rank of 1 = the most deprived LSOA in England), and the least deprived areas are the 10% least 
deprived LSOAs ranked the lowest on the same measure. In this example only, we are comparing the 
least deprived 10% with the most deprived 30% of LSOAs. 
33
 Hansard Society (2009) Audit of Political Engagement, 6. The 2009 Report. 
34
 Hansard Society (2009) Audit of Political Engagement, 6. The 2009 Report. 
 
35
 People could give more than one reason as the response to this question 
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concerns.36  Trust in the local council is higher in the least deprived 
neighbourhoods (67%) than in most deprived ones (58%).  Corresponding 
levels of trust in the police showed a more marked difference between the 
least deprived areas (where levels were high in the least deprived 
neighbourhoods, at 90%, compared with the most deprived ones, at 75%). 
 
9. As we have shown above, not everyone feels it is important to have 
influence, with 37% of people saying they would not like to be more 
involved in the decisions affecting the area.37  DCLG research38 found that 
people only want to have an influence on local issues that affect them, are 
salient, and about which they feel strongly. For example, parents were 
seen to be far more interested than those without children in educational 
issues because it affected their children directly.  
 
10. The issues that communities feel strongly about will differ. There are clear 
differences between the types of incidents reported between the most 
deprived areas and the least deprived ones on the fixmystreet.com 
website (a website in which people can report, view or discuss local 
problems). 39 Incident reports related to public facilities and services, and 
to littering and vandalism, were more likely to have been raised by people 
in the 10% most deprived areas than those in the 10% least deprived 
ones. In contrast, reports on roads and highways, and on potholes were 
more likely to arise from the least deprived areas.  
 
 
The importance of community networks and spaces40 
 
11. Qualitative research by the Centre for Regional Economic and Social 
Research (CRESR) in six low income neighbourhoods41 found that 
deprived neighbourhoods can be home to sets of relationships that 
constitute a resource pool from which people can draw support and help to 
get by, and that family – and to a lesser extent friends – provide sustained 
support.  
 
12.  The RSA‟s report, Connected Communities:  How social networks power 
and sustain the Big Society suggests that understanding social networks 
(such as the patterns of connectivity between people and community 
                                                 
36
 Demos (2010). Trust in Practice 
37
 Department for Communities and Local Government (2010) 2008-09 Citizenship Survey 
Empowered Communities Topic Report 
38
 DCLG 2008 Feeling able to influence local decision making; understanding, barriers, facilitators and 
strategies for increasing empowerment  
 
39
 Analysis by DCLG spatial analysis team based on around 90,000 incidents reported between Feb 
2007 and May 2010 on fixmystreet.com website.  
 
40
 This section draws on the RSA Connected Communities Social networks report, referenced above. 
Also relevant is Hickman, P. 2010. Neighbourhood Infrastructure, ‘Third Places’ and patterns of social 
interaction 
41
 Crisp, R and Robinson, D Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research, Sheffield Hallam 
University (2010). Family, Friends and Neighbours: Social Relations and support in Six Low income 
Neighbourhoods. 
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hubs) can help direct strategies to promote participative behaviour and 
volunteering. Having this understanding can, in principle, build capacity for 
the Big Society by identifying community hubs or members that are best 
placed to have an overview of existing community skills and needs, 
coordinate activity and spread useful information and opportunity.  
 
13.  Through their detailed analysis of social networks in New Cross Gate, a 
deprived area of London, the researchers found a sizeable minority of the 
173 people interviewed in this area (one in four respondents) did not know 
anyone who they thought was good at bringing people together or could 
help them contact someone with influence, power or responsibility to 
change things locally. And one in fifty respondents did not know anybody 
in their local area that supported them or helped them to make changes in 
any way. 
 
14. The research found that most „disengaged‟ people do have social ties 
within their communities through a variety of channels, but often they may 
be „familiar strangers‟ like postmen or dustmen, or social caretakers rather 
than „usual suspects‟ such as the ward councillor (more people recognised 
and found value in their postman than their local councillor). These 
channels might be utilised to provide a bridge between isolated people in 
the community and, for example, local services, community groups and 
other residents.  
 
15. National research42 sheds light on some of the factors that can weaken 
social ties in an area. Adults living in the most deprived areas are 
substantially less likely to feel that people in their neighbourhood can be 
trusted than people who live in the least deprived neighbourhoods (63% 
compared with 94%). They are also less likely to feel that people in the 
neighbourhood share the same values (60% compared with 92%).   
 
16. Participation in a group is one way of linking people so that they might 
engage in or develop capacity for Big Society activities, but adults in the 
most deprived neighbourhoods are rather less likely to take part in, 
support or helped a group, club or organisation (42%) compared with 73% 
of those in the least deprived areas. 
 
17. Research in lower income neighbourhoods found that public places such 
as local shops, pubs, cafes, clubs and community centres are important 
and valued mediums for interaction. The most important are shops and 
markets. Although all socio-demographic groups made use of such places, 
residents who spent most of their day at home (because they were 
unemployed, in poor health, retired or had caring responsibilities) were 
particularly likely to use them. But some residents were deterred from 
using some of these places because: 
o they perceived their regular users to be unwelcoming or even 
hostile;  
o they found it difficult to use because of ill-health or disability;  
                                                 
42
 Subsequent information in this section is from the Citizenship Survey 
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o they were reluctant to venture from their homes after dark; or 
o they lacked the „social confidence‟ to do so.  
  
Encouraging people to volunteer to improve their areas 
 
18. Volunteering activity which benefits other people or the environment is 
central to the Big Society and there is interest in the degree to which 
communities can pull together to improve their own neighbourhoods.  
 
19. One in four adults in England (25%) volunteers regularly as part of a group 
i.e. as formal volunteers.43 As one would expect, higher proportions of 
adults volunteer formally but less frequently; 40% volunteer at least once a 
year as part of a group.  
 
20. People in the most deprived areas are much less likely to be regular 
formal volunteers than those in the least deprived areas (16% compared 
with 33%). Geo-demographic analysis by DCLG has shown formal 
volunteering is over-represented among certain ACORN44 categories and 
types: „wealthy achievers‟, „prudent pensioners‟ and „affluent greys.‟45  
 
21. Levels of informal volunteering, whereby people help out as individuals 
rather than as part of a group, are higher: 29% of adults do this regularly 
i.e. once a month at least, and over half (54%) do this at least once a 
year.46   
 
22. In poorer areas, people do „help out‟, through informal volunteering. There 
is no statistically significant difference between the proportions of people 
who engage in informal volunteering between those in the 10% most 
deprived areas (30%) and those in the 10% least deprived areas (34%). 
 
23. Other observations are that: women were more likely than men to 
participate in both formal volunteering (28% compared with 23%) and 
informal volunteering (38% compared with 31%); and younger people 
(those aged under 35) were less likely than older people (those aged 35-
74) to have participated in formal volunteering47 
 
24. The most common reasons people give for not volunteering formally are 
work commitments or looking after children or the home: 58% of adults 
who did not regularly participate in formal volunteering gave work 
commitments as the reason, and 31% said they have to look after the 
children or the home.  
                                                 
43
 The Citizenship Survey defines formal volunteering as giving unpaid help through groups, 
clubs, or organisations to benefit other people or the environment. 
44
 ACORN is a geodemographic segmentation of the UK‟s population which segments small 
neighbourhoods, postcodes, or consumer households into 5 categories, 17 groups and 56 
types 
45
 DCLG in house analysis (unpublished) 
46
 The Citizenship Survey defines informal volunteering as giving unpaid help as an individual 
to people who are not relatives'. 
47
 DCLG (2008-09) Citizenship Survey: Volunteering and Charitable Giving Topic Report. 
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25. Lack of information was also a barrier to volunteering, with 18% of those 
who did not volunteer, or did so infrequently, saying that they had not 
heard about opportunities to help out, and 14% saying they did not know 
of any groups that needed help.  
 
26. Most people found out about opportunities to take part in volunteering with 
a group through other people they know or from other groups they belong 
to. Among the numerous ways in which regular formal volunteers said they 
found out about opportunities, 56% said they found out from someone who 
was already involved in the group. Other significant routes into formal 
volunteering were: by word of mouth or from a friend who was not involved 
in the group (24%); from school, college or university (24%); through 
having previously used the services of that group (22%), and through their 
place of worship (21%). These routes demonstrate the positive ways in 
which existing networks can be used to build the Big Society. 
 
27. In addressing the broader question of whether people do things to improve 
their areas, we looked at Citizenship Survey findings on whether 
respondents felt that people in their neighbourhood pull together to 
improve it. The extent to which this happens is of particular interest in 
deprived areas, where the Place Survey (covering England, and adults 
only) finds people have the lowest levels of satisfaction with the local 
area48. Analysis by Ipsos Mori of 323 local authorities found a negative 
correlation between levels of satisfaction reported in each local authority 
and the IMD. 
 
28. The proportion of adults who feel that people pull together to improve the 
neighbourhood is highest in the least deprived areas (a view held by 78%) 
of people in the least deprived 10% of LSOAs). But there is a sizeable 
proportion of people in the most deprived areas who also feel people pull 
together to improve their neighbourhoods (51% of those in the most 
deprived 10% of LSOAs).  
 
29. Previous meetings with local community activists and groups by the 
Department demonstrated how those who do volunteer or get involved in 
deprived areas may be dealing with difficult social problems, for example 
by working to reduce anti-social behaviour, helping young people to 
improve their employment prospects, or engaging with residents of a 
housing estate to ease the arrival of migrants to the area. These activists 
highlighted the need for culture change among officers and institutions in 
engaging with volunteer and community groups. Some of the observations 
they made were: 
o There is a widespread lack of awareness and understanding in 
local government, other public agencies and the voluntary sector 
about the resident-led part of the community sector and the 
benefits that partnership with residents can bring…the 
grassroots level is off the radar or invisible to institutions.  
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 Department for Communities and Local Government (2009) Place Survey, 2008 
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o People working as community members or volunteers are 
underestimated: perhaps they do not have the qualifications, 
lack a uniform, or do not have conventional premises e.g. they 
work from a car boot. Officials can often be condescending. 
o Community groups ought to challenge the norm and come up 
with improved ways of doing things. But local authorities would 
rather keep them „locked in a drawer‟ until the occasions when 
they want to „show them off‟. 
 
 
 
Additional References: 
Further details of the material in this section can be found at:  
 
Department for Communities and Local Government (2010) 2008-09 
Citizenship Survey Empowered Communities Topic Report 
 
Department for Communities and Local Government (2010) 2008-09 
Citizenship Survey Community Cohesion Topic Report 
 
Department for Communities and Local Government (2010) 2008-09 
Citizenship Survey Volunteering and Charitable Giving Topic Report 
 
Department for Communities and Local Government, Citizenship Survey 
2008-09: Cohesion Topic Report  
 
Department for Communities and Local Government, 2008 Citizenship Survey 
Empowered Topic Report 
 
Department for Communities and Local Government, Citizenship Survey, 
Statistical Release, April 2009-March 2010 
 
Department for Communities and Local Government, 2008-09 Citizenship 
Survey Volunteering and Charitable Giving Topic Report 
 
Hansard Society (2009) Audit of Political Engagement, 6. The 2009 Report. 
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WHAT TRIGGERS ENGAGEMENT IN THE BIG SOCIETY? – Liz 
Richardson, Institute of Political and Economic Governance, University 
of Manchester; and LSE 
 
1. This section examines some key empirical evidence49 of drivers, enablers 
and barriers to building local community action and the Big Society. It does 
so by looking at four specific studies of which three were field experiments, 
using experimental techniques, including randomised controlled trials 
which are considered by many to be the „gold standard‟ of evaluation, but 
which are relatively rare in public policy. 
 
Changing local authorities into mobilisers; and changing complainers 
into volunteers  
 
2. How can a local authority, who comes into daily contact with thousands of 
its local residents, increase the number and range of people engaged in 
civic activity, and turn „complainers‟ into active volunteers?  In 2008-9, the 
Institute for Political and Economic Governance (IPEG) at the University of 
Manchester undertook a design experiment with Blackburn with Darwen 
Borough Council to try to answer this question. 
 
3. Callers to the local authority customer Contact Centre reporting a problem 
or making a query were asked if they wanted to get more involved in 
the neighbourhood, after their initial query or complaint had been dealt 
with. This was an unusual step for a local authority to take. It was a 
seemingly small adjustment to the Contact Centre script. However, this 
was an important „nudge‟50 and also implied a fundamental shift in the 
institutional „default setting‟ or „choice architecture‟ -  from seeing people 
as customers or service users, to seeing them also as potential citizens.  
 
4. Existing practice by local government institutions as „official bodies‟ 
suggests a limited and not fully effective mobilising role. Local government 
often advertises local events and activities, and most contribute funding to 
volunteer bureaux – although 2007-8 data51 shows that only three per cent 
of adults found out about volunteering opportunities from Volunteer 
Bureaux, fewer than ten per cent through advertising, and over half by 
word of mouth. At the same time, each local government body conducts 
thousands of direct transactions with citizens and service users, but does 
not use these contact points as mobilising opportunities. A civic „ask‟ is not 
made of residents during these routine service interactions. There may 
well be a reciprocal civic ask being made of the same citizens by the 
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authority, for example, to join in a neighbourhood clean-up day. But that 
ask is often made by a different department, at a different time, through an 
indirect route (e.g. posters at a local school), and very usually generates 
extremely low returns. 
 
5. In contrast, this project represented an institutional re-design of the 
normally one-way transactional relationship between citizen and authority 
to a two-way reciprocal relationship. It also drew on an America study of 
models of civic voluntarism 52, which shows how vital „the ask‟, or 
mobilisation, is for volunteering. Later work by Lowndes53 et al. (2006) 
extends the civic voluntarism model and sets out an enhanced formal role 
for public institutions as mobilisers in their own right, and as mobilisers of a 
wider group of citizens beyond the institutions‟ own members or 
employees.  
 
6. Initial resistance and wariness from some officers in the council illustrated 
the significance of the shift. From the start of the research, there had been 
some concern from local authority staff that there would be an adverse 
reaction from citizens to this change of approach. In particular the contact 
centre managers were worried that people phoning to report problems or 
make complaints might be aggravated by being invited to be proactive on 
neighbourhood issues; those reporting a problem with a local service 
would be angry at being asked to take action themselves. Members of 
staff were not convinced that people would welcome a change in the 
nature of the relationship. 
 
7. These concerns were not borne out by citizens‟ responses. The research 
tested the assumptions about citizens‟ preferences. The doubts of 
members of staff proved to be unfounded among those citizens who took 
part. People were happy to be mobilised by public institutions. Citizens 
were generally supportive, with 92 per cent across both intervention and 
comparison groups agreeing that the council should encourage callers to 
get more involved.  
 
8. Over two 3 week periods, focused on just two neighbourhoods and two 
telephone „lines‟ at the Contact centre, 66 people signed up. There was a 
broad range by age, gender and ethnicity. A third had not previously been 
involved in civic activity. There were differences between those recruited 
from the more and less affluent neighbourhoods which reflected the 
different population profile, e.g. higher proportion of elderly people with 
mobility problems in the more deprived area. 
 
9. However, the initial surge in interest was not translated into activity. The 
fundamental initial shift in how people were dealt with at the contact centre 
succeeded in creating a positive citizen response. But, in the first wave, 
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the experiment failed to capitalise on the initial expression of interest in the 
follow-up intervention. The menu of options offered to interested citizens 
was largely focused on attending public meetings or joining local 
community associations to help with their limited range of activities, in 
tightly prescribed roles. There were few options that fitted people‟s 
preferences.  
 
10. The original intention was to offer a creative menu of voluntary options 
based on individuals‟ skills and interests. However, the authority was not 
aware that it was offering options that better suited itself and its skill set, 
rather than options tailored to the citizen. Participants in the initial wave 
intervention were offered an arguable uninspiring menu of involvement in 
existing neighbourhood groups and fora – easy for the authority to 
understand, based on an established repertoire of engagement skills, 
known entities, low supervision and transaction costs. In fact the newly 
engaged citizens would have preferred options which gave them a 
stronger voice, were more flexible, were less based on local authority led 
group activities or requiring citizens to set up new groups,  
 
11. A second wave of the experiment started to correct this failure, although 
the speed at which this happened meant that we lost momentum with the 
initial group recruited. In the second wave the experiment used the things 
citizen‟s said they wanted to do to develop new options. For those wanting 
to use their views more constructively to improve services, the authority 
then started to set up a „mystery shopping‟ scheme. For those wanting to 
offer help to neighbours, the authority facilitated a „Good neighbours‟ 
scheme for residents to offer social support to isolated older people 
through a „good morning‟ phone call.  
 
Empowering people to take action – public recognition to encourage 
charitable giving 
 
12. Are people more or less likely to make a charitable donation if they receive 
public recognition for doing so? The example explored here was a 
randomised controlled trial (RCT) by IPEG at the University of Manchester 
which tested the effectiveness of two different “nudges” to try to persuade 
people to make a charitable donation. 
 
13. Studies show that one way of encouraging people to give is to promise 
them public recognition as a thank you for making a donation. Practical 
examples of how public recognition is already used to promote giving 
include: the inclusion of the names of donor individuals and companies in 
brochures for public festivals and charitable events and prominent public 
displays of a list of sponsors in art galleries, theatres, community centres. 
Laboratory experiments indicate that donors appreciate the prestige they 
get from having their donations made public, and when donations are 
advertised in categories (e.g. gold, silver or bronze donors), people will 
more often give the minimum amount needed to appear in a higher 
category. „Image motivation‟ describes how citizens may be motivated by 
how others perceive their behaviour: when individuals are seeking social 
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approval, they may choose to exhibit qualities that they think are widely 
regarded as „good‟.  
 
14. There are other studies that support these concepts. For example the 
MINDSPACE framework developed by the Institute for Government and 
Cabinet Office54 uses similar ideas of commitment and ego to explain how 
we are motivated to behave in certain ways by our desire to be consistent 
with our public promises, and reciprocate acts, and act in ways that make 
us feel better about ourselves.  
 
15. In this study, we wished to test the effectiveness of two nudges - asking for 
a pledge and offering public recognition - on charitable donations55. We 
were interested to discover whether making a pledge encourages people 
to give because they feel they have made a promise and want to see it 
through. We were also interested in whether households who are advised 
their donation will be made public are encouraged to give because their 
generosity will be advertised to their peers.  
 
16. In the spring of 2010 we organized a campaign to collect books for use in 
school libraries in South Africa. The research was undertaken in 
partnership with Community HEART, a UK registered charity formed by 
anti-apartheid activist Denis Goldberg, which supports local self-help 
initiatives in South Africa. In the MINDSPACE framework, the use of a 
voluntary sector partner as our „messenger‟ was critical. The research was 
undertaken with 12,000 households in two electoral wards in Manchester, 
UK. One of the wards is relatively affluent and largely made up of private 
housing; the other is relatively deprived, with a high proportion of social 
rented housing. Households were randomly assigned to one of three 
groups of equal size:  
 a pledge group which were asked to pledge;  
 a pledge-plus-publicity group, which got the pledge and who were also 
told that if they donated their names would be put up in a public place; 
 a control group who were asked to donate in a letter, but without the 
pledge or the offer of publicity. 
 
17. Overall, 8% of households (1,000 households) donated books. We 
received 7,000 books in total. However, the pledge campaign on its own 
had no statistically significant effect. The pledge campaign plus the offer 
of public recognition did achieve a statistically significant effect 
compared to the control group, with an effect size of 22%. There were 
similar effects in the more and less deprived areas from different starting 
points, with higher levels of donations in the more affluent area as might 
be expected.  
 
18. The impacts of the campaign were modest, but positive, and generated for 
relatively low cost for the research. The activity was also relatively low cost 
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for the givers; it is not clear whether this could be translated into a more 
intense or sustained citizen contribution.  
 
 
Empowering people to take action – stimulating community self help in 
the Trafford Hall DIY Project 
 
19. Communities need the skills and tools to take control. How these are 
provided is a key question, and in particular what the balance should be 
between being provided by national government  (including the question 
about “guidance”), as opposed to being provided by the third or private 
sectors. But someone must engage with the communities to support them.  
 
20.  The “Trafford Hall DIY Project” was designed to stimulate and support 
intensive community action by small groups of active citizens.  It was a five 
year action research project, led by LSE Housing at the London School of 
Economics,and  delivered in partnership with Trafford Hall, home of the 
National Communities Resource Centre.  It involved monitoring of 
participants through records of attendance, developmental and summative 
evaluation based on written feedback from 1,600 community volunteers, 
and around 100 in-depth interviews with community groups across the UK 
conducted during on-site visits to community projects in low-income 
neighbourhoods, as well as documentation and observation of the project 
as a piece of action research.56   
 
21. The Project offered residential community training courses on „How-To‟ 
subjects, e.g. how to work with young people, how to set up a community 
cafe. 20-25 people attended each course from different neighbourhoods 
across the UK. There was a small grant fund for community groups to put 
their ideas into practice after the courses. Trafford Hall have since used 
the community training and small grants model to develop a range of 
programmes including on community responses to climate change, 
community-led projects to tackle crime, and ways to get social enterprise. 
 
22. Over five years, 1,800 people from over 700 community groups attended 
93 training courses. 75% of training participants came from social housing 
estates, and three quarter of the study neighbourhoods were low-income 
areas of concentrated deprivation  (Richardson, 2008, p-13-16), where 
participation levels tend to be lower than in more affluent areas, and 
require additional support for people unused to negotiating around formal 
or public systems. All came from small, mostly unincorporated, community 
groups. A third of the community participants had been involved in 
volunteering for under a year.  
 
23. In terms of learning and action outcomes, 77% of training participants said 
the training had given them more motivation to take forward their ideas, 
73% had acquired new facts and inspiration,and  practical project ideas, 
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and 42% had kept in touch with people they met on the courses after the 
event, developing networks of others doing similar things. Three out of five 
groups took some action towards setting up a project following the course; 
the other two groups out of five planned to. The project also gave small 
grants to 115 community projects.  17% of groups that attended training 
courses applied for small grants.  Groups received grants to run small 
scale activities e.g. fishing trips, community cafes, youth activities, 
community green space improvements and allotments. Including other 
activities by the groups, we collected 476 examples of successful 
community-led work in neighbourhoods, including projects to rescue 
derelict  communal and green spaces, changes to the delivery of public 
services, work to strengthen citizenship e.g. with young people,  
 
24. Although the intervention was more about handholding (or „tickling‟) than 
nudging, there are some common elements with the experimental studies 
set out above.  
 The role of public recognition and reward for volunteers‟ efforts 
given by a national programme.  
 The potential for strengthened motivation for community organizers 
when they can see that others are engaged in similar things.  
 The importance of an independent third sector organisation leading 
the programme. 
 
Making public bodies transparent and strengthening democratic 
accountability – citizen groups lobbying local councillors 
 
25. In a well-functioning local democracy, locally-elected representatives work 
closely with community organisations and other groups57. However, 
relationships between councillors and community groups are not always 
as supportive or close as they could be. Many community organisations 
are keen to build relationships with members but unsure how to approach 
this. The Building Links project tested out different ways that community 
organisations could approach local councillors, get their attention, and win 
support for their work. How could both sides work together on relevant 
local issues and problems? The aim was to see which, if any, was the 
more effective approach.   
 
26. The research project that IPEG conducted on these topics was a 
randomised controlled trial of citizen interest groups lobbying their local 
elected members. Here, we look at the third and fourth decentralisation 
principles together, „making public bodies transparent‟ and „strengthening 
democratic accountability‟.  
 
27. We recruited eight community groups, spread across the country in eight 
different local authorities. Each group had a real local issue they wanted to 
tackle, but all were keen to make stronger connections to their local 
councillors. With each group, we devised two different letters on the same 
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topic. Each letter asked for help with the same problem, but one approach 
was information-rich, the other information-poor. 
 
28. The groups then randomly selected half of the councillors in their authority, 
and then randomly allocated those councillors to receive one of the two 
letters. We measured the results by a) the number of replies to each of the 
two letters b) the helpfulness of the replies. Overall, only 18.5 per cent of 
councillors responded to either letter. There was a considerable variation 
according to local authority ranging from 4.2 to 30.6 per cent.  
 
29. The information-poor letter received more responses overall, with the 
information-poor letter getting a 21.8% response, and the information-rich 
letter had a 15.3% response. However, this result was not statistically 
significant, and therefore it cannot be said that there was a difference 
between the two letters. Overall, the stronger treatment - in the form of the 
information-rich letter - does not yield a greater response than the 
information-poor letter. 
 
30. Helpful responses included councillors expressing a willingness to meet, 
and offering face-to-face follow up discussions, or positively signposting 
the lobbyist on to colleagues, the issue would be better dealt with by 
someone else. Less helpful and dismissive responses included councillors 
stating it was not their remit or responsibility and the letter writer needed to 
go elsewhere, without positively signposting the lobbyist on to colleagues, 
referring them on, or even in many cases offering a relevant name to the 
writer. 
 
31. There was a statistically significant difference in the helpfulness of the 
responses, with the information-rich letter encouraging councillors to pass 
on the request to another party in a helpful way.  
 
32. What is noticeable is the low level of response to either of the letters, from 
community groups willing to help tackle what they see as a genuine local 
issue. This indicates a need to further develop ward members as 
community leaders. It suggests that more work is needed to build 
relationships between community organisations and local members, and 
push harder to debate and broker ongoing battles over the legitimacy of 
different forms of democracy. 
 
33. This project was not designed to be an attack on local elected members, 
the majority of whom perform very valuable service for their wards while 
being heavily criticised by the public. However, it suggests that UK local 
politicians may still be suffer from a perception of themselves as weak 
status and low power, and changes to decision making structures in local 
government may be needed to address this, e.g. stronger roles for 
Overview and Scrutiny. The response may reveals the context of British 
local government where representation is devalued and where elected 
councillors fail to develop a representative role, preferring to defer to the 
political executive and the professional sources of expertise in the officer 
corps. Local councillors may not have had enough confidence to respond 
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to a better-argued letter, but they realised they should pass it on to 
someone who presumably could in their view respond in a more effective 
way. As these local representatives have weak status and low power, it is 
possible that, under these conditions, informational lobbying is not as 
effective as it may be at the state or national level.  
 
34. Demands on local politicians have substantially increased in the last 
decade. Another possible explanation of the responses may be that a rise 
in the number of internal organisational and party political demands has 
left less time to represent the people who voted them in, or process 
lobbying requests from unknown bodies. Some preliminary follow up 
research for this project also suggests councillors feel overwhelmed by 
irrelevant paperwork and demands. Local authorities could manage their 
communications with members to allow members to focus on their 
priorities. 
 
Additional References: 
Further details of the material in this section can be found at:  
 
Lupia, A. and Sin, G. (2003), „Which public goods are endangered?: How 
evolving communication technologies affect the logic of collective action‟, 
Public Choice 117: 315-331.  
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MANAGING RISK AND PROMOTING RESILIENCE: THE BIG SOCIETY 
AND SPATIAL POLARISATION –Ruth Lupton, Senior Research Fellow, 
LSE 
 
1. Does it matter at all if there is variation in the take-up of Big Society-type 
activities in different areas of the country?  Levels of influence and 
volunteering already vary by area. With the new rights and greater 
freedoms for councils, there will be many more opportunities for 
communities to get involved, and in the context of spending cuts there will 
also be greater urgency for people to get involved in prioritising spending 
and also in looking within their communities for the resources to help 
themselves (time to help someone, to volunteer, money). 
 
2. So some variation is inevitable, and it may be also argued that some 
variation in service delivery is desirable, if this reflects difference in 
preferences between communities.   By the same token, some difference 
in outcomes might also be acceptable or even desirable. One community, 
for example, might prefer to tolerate worse outcomes on a particular issue 
(for example more potholes in the roads) as a trade off against better 
outcomes in another (eg reading standards in schools).   
 
3. These arguments depend on the operation of a fully functioning 
participative democracy, in which people have equal opportunities and 
capabilities to exercise their rights, and to exercise voice.  If this is not the 
case, decisions about the distribution of outcomes are made by a small 
group of people and not others, leading to some people/areas getting 
better services while others miss out.  There is the potential for this to lead 
to widening gaps in outcomes and between rich and poor (if the rich add to 
their services while the poor maintain theirs at the same level), and also 
potentially to absolutely worse services and outcomes for the poor if they 
are unable to step in to maintain services previously provided by the 
state).   
 
4. Either situation (the latter in particular) is arguably: 
 
 Unfair  
 More expensive in the long run (for example if preventive 
services cannot be delivered) 
 Wasteful of human capacity 
 Detrimental to social mobility 
 Bad for everyone, if the arguments of Wilkinson and Pickett‟s 
book The Spirit Level58 are accepted 
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5. A further risk is that the unequal exercise of new decision-making and 
service delivery options could lead to perceived unfairness (“why has x 
group got y service, when z group has not?”).  Unless carefully managed, 
this can be divisive and lead to conflict between groups.  Government 
intervention to distribute services and outcomes evenly has been used in 
the past precisely because people have different capacities and 
propensities to become involved, and tend to be motivated by their own 
self interest. Government has had a role in smoothing the distribution of 
services and ensuring that decision-making processes are transparent and 
fair.  New ways need to be found to manage these risks in a situation of 
smaller government. 
 
6. What, then, are the risks which need to be managed in the light of the 
variation in levels of deprivation across communities?  Frist, at an 
individual level, poverty/disadvantage presents risks to participation 
in the Big Society. Therefore areas of concentrated poverty and 
disadvantage are likely to have lower levels of participation. 
7. As covered in more detail above, people in low skilled occupations and 
lower social classes are least likely to volunteer formally for multiple 
reasons which include their specific capacities (experience, confidence, 
skill, trust etc) but also the economic realities that they face, including  
 Lack of money (for transport, childcare, etc) 
 Poorer health (own and family) 
 Work commitments (long or unsocial hours).  
 Stresses/time involved in managing on low income, including 
caring responsibilities, depression and anxiety  
 (for some) transience/insecure housing 
8. Measures which focus on lifting people out of poverty, providing free 
support services, and preventing labour market exploitation (for example, 
enforcing the National Minimum Wage and raising it to a living wage), are 
all likely to free up capacity to participate in the Big Society. 
 
9. We therefore need a clear focus on understanding these more structural 
constraints on participation, as well as focusing on building personal 
capacities.  Burchardt‟s (2008) work on time and income poverty59 is an 
example of an analytical approach which could support analysis of these 
constraints. Burchardt identifies not only those who suffer income poverty 
and time poverty, but those who have no capability to increase their 
income above the poverty threshold without reducing the time they need 
for other essential activities below a minimum level, or conversely people 
who cannot increase the amount of disposable time they have without 
pushing their income below the poverty line.  Analysis of multiple 
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constraints like these could help identify people who are genuinely unable 
to participate regardless of skills, confidence and other dimensions of 
cooperation. 
 
10. Second, spatial patterns of disadvantage are persistent and become 
more marked when inequality increases and during downturns. We 
know, there are very sharp differences in collective resources between 
areas, as illustrated in the report of the National Equality Panel (2010)60. 
Lack of capacity to participate is therefore likely to have a strong spatial 
distribution.  
 
11. Although some areas do recover from acute disadvantage (for example if 
they are gentrified, if new housing is built, or more rarely if there are new 
concentrations of employment), much evidence reveals that spatial 
patterns of disadvantage are very persistent. For example: 
 
 Of the 600 communities in the top 10 per cent in England for 
unemployment in 2009, three-quarters were in the top 10 per cent 
in 2005 when unemployment was much lower, and nearly half had 
been in the top 10 per cent in boom and bust since 1985 (Tunstall 
with Fenton 200961) 
 Of the areas in the top decile for benefits receipt in 1999, 86 per 
cent were still in the top decile in 2005, six years later (Palmer et al 
200662). 
12. We should expect, therefore, that patterns of constraints on participation in 
the Big Society will also be persistent.  
 
13. Moreover, as Dorling et al. (2007)63 have shown, spatial inequalities tend 
(not surprisingly) to increase when society becomes more unequal overall, 
and there are also cyclical effects. During recessions, area unemployment 
rates tend to diverge as those who occupy the most marginal positions in 
the labour market are most likely to lose their jobs (see figure below from 
Tunstall with Fenton). 
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14. Third, some poor areas are particularly vulnerable to rapid decline 
which can inhibit/destroy community involvement. Evidence from 
previous recessions shows that some poor areas are particularly 
vulnerable to very rapid decline. Lupton and Power64 have described a 
cycle of decline (shown below) in which neighbourhood unpopularity 
(fuelled perhaps by crime or anti-social behaviour or simply by location 
and quality of housing stock in a situation where there is surplus housing 
because people are moving away in search of work) leads to high 
numbers of empty properties, further social problems, declining 
confidence, surveillance and supervision, more people leaving and so on. 
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15. In this situation, neighbourhoods experience a decline in their physical 
environment and a withdrawal or decline of private and public sector 
services. Crucially, residents also feel that they can no longer control 
conditions in the neighbourhood, and that no-one in authority is helping 
them. While a small number of active residents tend to persist in battling 
for action, the majority become more distrustful of neighbours and less 
likely to participate, leading to further decline of social order. 
 
16. This cycle of decline poses a real risk to the Big Society.  Since the early 
1990s recession, measures have been taken to prevent this scenario 
developing again. In particular, much surplus housing stock has been 
removed.  However, there may still be neighbourhoods that are at risk of 
rapid decline: identification of these and early intervention needs to be a 
priority. 
 
17. All of these points mean that current economic circumstances create 
a particular challenge for implementing the Big Society in poor areas.  
So what can be done about it?  Clearly there are specific messages 
about how to encourage and sustain participation: many of these were 
covered in the earlier papers.  However, government can also actively 
manage the impact of economic decline on poor neighbourhoods, to 
create conditions in which the Big Society has a better chance to flourish. 
 
18. Evidence from families living in low income neighbourhoods over the last 
10 years suggests that neighbourhood-level investment and action makes 
a real difference to people‟s lives and to their feelings about their 
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neighbourhoods and their propensity to get involved (Power (2007)65). Key 
points include: 
 Giving real influence over local services (e.g. Sure Start model) 
• Responsive front line service providers (people!) providing „eyes and 
ears‟, visible supervision, and a quick response; 
• Co-ordinated neighbourhood management 
• Affordable things for people (especially) to do (e.g. classes, free 
swimming for kids)… 
• …with staff involvement as well as volunteers 
• Better quality mainstream services e.g. schools, with funding to cover 
additional challenges  
• In fast changing communities, brokering relations between groups, and 
enabling residential stability 
19. Mismanagement of major decisions (for example, housing redevelopment) 
can, however, destroy the goodwill gained by these smaller actions. 
 
20. Overall, it is likely that more consideration needs to be given to specific 
interventions to support Big Society activities in areas where there is most 
risk that they won‟t occur spontaneously, although these on their own are 
unlikely to ensure equal outcomes.  Government needs to continue with 
wider policies to prevent rising inequality and those which maintain 
investment in the most vulnerable areas.  In a situation where 
responsibility for such areas is devolved to local government, this could 
include prioritising direct service delivery in poorer areas, or prioritising 
voluntary sector grants in such areas.  There may also be mileage in 
emphasising the philanthropic elements of the Big Society at a local level 
(i.e. helping the community next door). 
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